Add Permission Group Item Skill

You are adding one governed item an organization admin can withhold from a cohort of members. One entry in apps/sim/lib/permission-groups/fields.ts produces the write schema, the read schema, the PermissionGroupConfig type, the defaults, the tolerant parser, and (for a boolean) the admin editor row.

The registry does not produce enforcement. Twelve keys once shipped with a checkbox, a hint, and no server check — an organization that ticked hideCopilot believed it had withheld a capability while every route still answered. Hence the enforcement field, the required capability field on every operation, and scripts/check-permission-group-enforcement.ts. You are done when something refuses, not when the key parses.

Read the system first

• lib/permission-groups/fields.ts — registry, three field builders, permissionGroupConfigSchema, tolerantArray, parsePermissionGroupConfig. There is no types.ts (folded in here); the DB constraint maps live in constraints.ts
• lib/permission-groups/capabilities.ts — CAPABILITY_IDS, CAPABILITY_RULES, capabilityRefusal, refuseCapability, the static/parameterized split
• lib/permission-groups/capability-assertions.ts — the sanctioned assertion API; re-exports capabilityRefusal. capability-error.ts holds the thrown error, capability-response.ts the raw-route 403
• lib/permission-groups/integration-allowlist.ts — the canonicalizing allowlist algebra, over the generated block-successors.generated.ts
• lib/permission-groups/resolve.server.ts — resolveWorkspaceGroup, resolveVerifiedUserAccessControlContext, getUserPermissionConfig, getUserPermissionConfigForOrganization, mergeEnvAllowlist. ee/access-control/utils/permission-check.ts re-exports it and keeps the executor gates
• lib/permission-groups/config-scope.server.ts (resolvePermissionGroupConfig, the per-request memo every assertion resolves through) and request-scope.server.ts (withPermissionGroupScope, deliberately import-free because withRouteHandler imports it)
• lib/core/application/workspace-operation.ts and workspace-authorization.ts — the required capability field, and the funnel
• scripts/check-permission-group-enforcement.ts, check-application-graph.ts, check-capability-subject.ts

(Paths are under apps/sim/ unless noted.)

Step 0: Decide what kind of thing it is

Kind	Builder	Default	Semantics
Boolean restriction	booleanRestriction(enforcement, feature)	false	true withholds. Name it hideX / disableX, never allowX
Allowlist	allowlist(item, enforcement, { limited, empty })	null	null allows everything; a list names the only permitted members; [] permits none
Denylist	denylist(item, enforcement, phrasing)	[]	Empty permits everything; members are refused

Allowlist when the safe posture is "only what the admin named" and the member set is enumerable (auth modes, connectors, model providers). Denylist when it is "everything except" and the set is open-ended (tool ids, models — an allowlist over a thousand tools grows a hole every time a tool ships).

Which mechanism refuses? The enforcement value is a claim the audit checks.

Value	Meaning
'capability'	An operation declares a capability whose rule reads the key; the funnel refuses before the use case runs. Default answer for anything reachable through an application operation
'executor'	Read per block/tool/model at run time by assertPermissionsAllowed in ee/access-control/utils/permission-check.ts. Governs what a run may do, which no operation gate can express (one API call executes fifty blocks). Only allowedIntegrations, allowedModelProviders, deniedModels, deniedTools live here. The matching primitives these four keys are compared with live in lib/permission-groups/ — block-access.ts (exemptions, superseded-version resolution), operation-access.ts (createToolAccessGate), model-access.ts (createModelAccessGate), integration-allowlist.ts — shared so the run-time gate and the editor/Copilot projections cannot drift. allowedIntegrations alone is also asserted outside a run, by assertSelectorIntegrationAllowed (lib/selectors/server/integration-access.ts) ahead of the provider call in selectors.execute, against the selector's own resourceServiceId / integrationBlockTypes rather than the credentials it accepts — reaching a provider API is a use of the integration, so a key here can still need a non-run enforcement site
'ui-only'	Hides a surface without withholding it. Almost never right — nothing ships as ui-only. Justify in the enforcement comment why a determined caller reaching the data is acceptable, and expect review to question it

Is it per-operation at all? personal_api_key.use is the one capability that is not: it withholds a principal kind across every operation, checked in the funnel's personal_api_key branch (workspace-authorization.ts) and again in app/api/v1/middleware.ts, so no operation declares it and its absence from every capability: field is correct rather than a hole.

Is the decision knowable from the config alone? A rule needing a request value (an auth mode, a connector id) is parameterized and cannot be declared on an operation — see Step 3.

Is it a gate or a projection? A key that withholds fields from a response rather than the response is a projection. hideTraceSpans and hideCostInfo work this way: the logs routes declare capability: 'none' and strip fields, because refusing the read would withhold the status and error message too. Projections have one owner — lib/logs/log-projection.ts (resolveLogFieldProjection, projectExecutionData, projectCostTotal), carrying the permission-group-enforced: annotations. Add yours there; two copies of a redaction rule is how one of them stops redacting. Corollary: refuse the query that selects on a withheld field — otherwise the projection is a filter oracle; logQuerySelectsCost / assertLogCostQueryAllowed in that same module are the shape.

Step 1: Append the field entry — never insert

  disableWidgetSharing: booleanRestriction('capability', {
    id: 'disable-widget-sharing',
    label: 'Widget Sharing',
    category: 'Collaboration',
    hint: 'Prevent sharing a widget outside the workspace.',
  }),

The second argument is the field's feature (PlatformFeatureMeta); PLATFORM_FEATURES spreads it and appends configKey, so those four values are what the editor renders. PLATFORM_FEATURES is derived from the registry in features.ts, so a boolean key cannot reach the config without reaching the editor.

• Declaration order is the wire order of PermissionGroupConfig, both zod schemas, and every config JSON crossing the API. fields.test.ts pins it with a key-order contract test, and ee/access-control/components/group-detail.tsx dirty-checks by comparing stringified configs — a moved key fails the suite and makes every open editor read as unsaved. Extend the tail; do not tidy the middle.
• The default must be the permissive value. Every stored permission_group.config row predates your key; parsePermissionGroupConfig fills the gap from the default and the update route merges a partial write over the stored config, so a restrictive default silently applies a new restriction to every existing group in every enterprise org. The builders hardcode false / null / [], so a new key must be phrased so the permissive value is falsy: a requireWidgetApproval whose safe default is true must be inverted before it can use booleanRestriction.
• The checkbox is inverted. group-detail.tsx renders checked={!editingConfig[feature.configKey]} — ticked means allowed, so an allowX name renders backwards.
• The hint must describe access withheld, never a surface hidden. A 'capability' key refuses at the API; "Hide the Tables module from the sidebar" tells an admin they are tidying a nav bar while they revoke a module. The same string is read again by getActivePermissionGroupRestrictions in features.ts as the prose for an active restriction — reaching users through the Copilot workspace VFS and the enterprise platform context — where "hide" is simply false. Write "Revoke the Tables module. Members cannot read or write any table." PlatformFeatureMeta.hint carries the rule in its TSDoc.
• The category must be in PLATFORM_CATEGORY_ORDER (features.ts): Modules, Knowledge Base, Tables, Files, Deployment, Tools, Logs, Collaboration, Credentials & Access. An unlisted category renders last. Categories name what is withheld — no surface-shaped section like "Sidebar".

Step 2: Only booleans get an admin UI for free

PLATFORM_FEATURES filters on field.kind === 'boolean-restriction'. An allowlist or denylist renders nothing — the key exists, the API accepts it, no admin can set it.

Nested pickers hang off the featureExtras map in group-detail.tsx, keyed by the feature id of the boolean it nests under, not the allowlist's own config key:

  const featureExtras: Partial<Record<string, ReactNode>> = {
    'hide-knowledge-base': <AllowlistField label='…' value={knowledgeConnectorValue}
      onChange={setKnowledgeConnectors} options={KNOWLEDGE_CONNECTOR_OPTIONS}
      disabled={editingConfig.hideKnowledgeBaseTab} />,
  }

Copy setKnowledgeConnectors. Two load-bearing behaviors:

• Refuse an empty selection (if (values.length === 0) return) — an emptied allowlist denies everyone while the parent checkbox still reads as allowed. Withholding the whole thing is what the parent is for.
• Collapse "all selected" back to null (values.length === ALL.length ? null : values) — storing the full set freezes the allowlist at today's members.

Choose the parent deliberately: allowedKnowledgeConnectors nests under hide-knowledge-base, not disable-knowledge-base-creation, because a connector attaches to an existing KB — nesting under creation would dim the picker for exactly the cohort it serves.

Step 3: Add the capability id and rule

Skip only for 'executor' / 'ui-only'. Add the id to CAPABILITY_IDS and the rule to CAPABILITY_RULES in capabilities.ts, which uses satisfies { readonly [K in PermissionGroupCapability]: CapabilityRule } so a new id fails to compile until its rule exists.

Never replace that satisfies with a type annotation. Annotating widens every entry to CapabilityRule, at which point StaticPermissionGroupCapability — derived by filtering the object's own entries for kind: 'static' — resolves to never: no operation can declare any capability, the type system goes quiet about capabilities entirely, and nothing at runtime looks wrong. AssertsStaticCapabilityResolves at the bottom of the file exists to catch it. Same reasoning for any of these registries.

Capability ids are domain-shaped (tables.create); config keys are surface-shaped (disableTableCreation). CAPABILITY_RULES is the only place the two vocabularies meet.

  'widgets.share': {
    kind: 'static',
    configKeys: ['disableWidgetSharing'],
    detailCode: 'PERMISSION_GROUP_CAPABILITY_BLOCKED',
    describe: 'Sharing widgets',
    deniedBy: (config) => config.disableWidgetSharing,
  },

configKeys is what the audit reads to prove your key is enforced — it must list every key deniedBy reads. describe is the subject of one shared sentence, "<describe> is not available under your organization's permission group", so make it a singular noun or gerund that agrees with "is". Exactly two functions build it, both defined in capabilities.ts: refuseCapability(cap) throws it as a PermissionGroupCapabilityError; capabilityRefusal(cap) returns it as a string for a raw route rendering its own body (capability-assertions.ts re-exports it so an inline gate reaches both through one module). Never write the sentence at a call site.

Use 'PERMISSION_GROUP_CAPABILITY_BLOCKED' for detailCode. Four rules carry a more specific one — deploy.chat.auth_mode (CHAT_AUTH_MODE_NOT_PERMITTED), file_share.publish / file_share.auth_mode (PUBLIC_SHARING_NOT_ALLOWED), personal_api_key.use (PERSONAL_API_KEYS_DISABLED) — which is why a call site reads the code off the rule and never spells one out. The set in lib/core/application/forbidden.ts is closed over remedies, not causes — a new code is warranted only when the remedy differs from "ask an organization admin", and requires an entry in FORBIDDEN_DETAIL_CODE_DESCRIPTIONS (a compile-time gate) plus a new value in the generated OpenAPI 403 description.

A parameterized rule is the same shape with kind: 'parameterized' and a deniedBy taking the request value second — 'knowledge.connectors' is (config, connectorType) => allowlistDenies(config.allowedKnowledgeConnectors, connectorType). It cannot be declared on an operation: the funnel decides from principal, workspace and operation, never request input, and widening it would touch every one of the hundreds of operations for the sake of two keys. defineWorkspaceOperation throws at definition time (Operation <id> declares parameterized capability <cap>; assert it from the use case instead) rather than letting the operation read as gated while the gate never fires.

Step 4: Declare it on the operations it governs, or assert it at the call site

capability is required on the ApplicationOperation base type (the capability field in lib/core/application/operation.ts), typed StaticPermissionGroupCapability | 'none' — required there, not only on defineWorkspaceOperation, so a bare object literal minted by a domain factory does not compile without it — and guarded at definition time (Operation <id> declares no capability; name one, or 'none' with a reason). The guard is not redundant: apps/sim/tsconfig.json excludes *.test.ts / *.test.tsx from type-checking and the enforcement audit walks past test files, so a fixture is the one construction site no static check reads. An absent capability does not deny — it throws Cannot read properties of undefined inside capabilityDeniedBy, and only for a caller whose organization actually has a permission group. It passes CI and every personal workspace, then fails in the tenants that bought the feature.

Static, and the operation is the whole decision — set capability and write no gate code:

export const shareWidget = defineWorkspaceOperation({
  id: 'widgets.share',
  minimumRole: 'write',
  workspaceApiKey: 'allow',
  capability: 'widgets.share',
  principalKinds: ['session', 'personal_api_key', 'workspace_api_key'],
})

The factory trap. An operation minted by a factory that does not call defineWorkspaceOperation — a hand-frozen object — bypasses the required type and, once bypassed, the audit. The audit therefore matches the whole define<Domain>Operation family, resolves a same-file function factory (capability fixed in the body or taken as a positional second argument — lib/table/application/operations.ts shows both, with no default on the positional form so nothing inherits tables.use unreviewed), and cross-checks the members of every exported *Operations registry against what it parsed, so a registry member it read no operation from is a finding rather than a tick. Keep new operations inside an exported *Operations registry, mint them through a define*Operation builder taking an object literal with a string id, and use a function factory rather than an arrow const.

Static, but no operation to hang it on — a raw route or an organization-level action.

Helper	Use when
assertWorkspaceCapability(userId, workspaceId, cap, organizationId?)	inside a use case — the thrown PermissionGroupCapabilityError is projected to a 403 for you
isWorkspaceCapabilityWithheld(userId, workspaceId, cap, organizationId?)	a raw handler rendering its own body — pair with capabilityRefusal(cap)
isOrganizationCapabilityWithheld(organizationId, cap)	an action naming an organization rather than a workspace
isCapabilityWithheldForUser(userId, cap, workspaceId?) (lib/permission-groups/user-scope.server.ts)	a user-level act that may or may not name a workspace — a personal API key, a CLI device-auth handoff. Resolves the workspace's group when given one, else falls back to the organization's default group rather than going ungoverned. Deliberately outside capability-assertions.ts: it reads org membership through the billing graph, and that module is a guarded root of check:application-graph
capabilityDeniedBy(cap, config)	you already hold a resolved config

Annotate the call site either way:

    // permission-group-enforced: logs.export — raw streaming route, no workspace operation to declare it on
    if (capabilityDeniedBy('logs.export', permissionConfig)) {
      return capabilityRefusalResponse('logs.export')
    }

capabilityRefusalResponse (lib/permission-groups/capability-response.ts) is the one builder for that 403 — it renders capabilityRefusal(cap) and reads details.code off the rule, so a hand-rolled NextResponse.json({ error: … }, { status: 403 }) reports the four specifically-coded capabilities as the generic block. v1 is deliberately not converged on it (resolveCapabilityRefusal in app/api/v1/middleware.ts renders v1's own { error: { code, message } } envelope).

isOrganizationCapabilityWithheld resolves through getUserPermissionConfigForOrganization, reading the organization's default group — a non-default group targets specific workspaces. It sits outside the per-request memo because that memo is keyed by user and workspace, and this decision is keyed by organization alone.

Parameterized — the helpers above are all typed StaticPermissionGroupCapability, so write a module-local wrapper that reads the rule and raises through refuseCapability, and annotate the call site. assertConnectorTypeAllowed in lib/knowledge/application/connectors.ts is the shape:

const RULE = CAPABILITY_RULES['knowledge.connectors']
if (!userId) return
const config = await resolvePermissionGroupConfig(userId, workspaceId, undefined)
if (config && RULE.deniedBy(config, connectorType)) refuseCapability('knowledge.connectors')

Always route through CAPABILITY_RULES and raise with refuseCapability — a config key spelled out inline silently stops denying when renamed, and a hand-written message drifts from the funnel's. validatePublicFileSharing and validateChatDeployAuth in ee/access-control/utils/permission-check.ts are the other two examples. Return early on a missing userId: a permission group is a membership of users, so an actorless caller resolves none, and throwing there turns a scheduled sync into a 500 instead of a refusal anyone can act on.

Genuinely ungoverned — write capability: 'none' with a // permission-group-exempt: <reason> comment directly above it ('none' is spelled out because an absent field cannot be told apart from an unreviewed one). A good reason names why no key applies and why a gate would be wrong: "the executor's own per-run store; no group key names it, and refusing would fail runs the group allows".

Surfaces that do not go through the funnel

Whose group applies — never userId off whatever identity is nearest. Each helper below returns null for a caller no group governs (workspace key, internal JWT, executor delegation), and null is a pass, not a denial.

You hold	Helper
Principal	capabilityGovernedPrincipalUserId (lib/core/application) — mirrors the funnel exactly, executor exemption included
v1 RateLimitResult	capabilityGovernedUserId(rateLimit) (app/api/v1/middleware.ts) — branches on keyType, never on the presence of userId
TableAccessPrincipal	capabilityGovernedUserId(principal) (app/api/table/utils.ts)
AuthResult from checkSessionOrInternalAuth	capabilityGovernedAuthUserId (same file) — an internal JWT's userId is the run's actor, a bystander

When the subject is persisted and read back later — the table dispatch pipeline stamps it on table_run_dispatches / table_row_executions so auto-fired cells run under the person the write was gated for — declare it capabilityGovernedUserId: string | null, required with an explicit null and never optional. An optional field with a fallback is how every producer that had not been taught the distinction silently inherited triggeredByUserId, an attribution naming the billed account; making omission a compile error is the whole enforcement. A persisted subject also has a lifecycle: lib/users/account-deletion.ts cancels the dispatches stamped with a deleted user.

• /api/v1 authorizes in app/api/v1/middleware.ts. Every route threads a V1RouteCapability (StaticPermissionGroupCapability | 'none', required and spelled out) whose value must match what its v2 or internal counterpart declares — v1 gets no mapping of its own. check-capability-subject.ts audits v1's subjects only, because the bug has shipped and been fixed twice there.
• Raw internal table routes (/api/table/**) share one gate in checkAccess (app/api/table/utils.ts), whose signature takes a TableAccessPrincipal union — { kind: 'user'; userId } or { kind: 'workspace_api_key'; keyCreatorUserId } — so a bare id does not type-check and only the kind that says so skips the gate. tableAccessPrincipal(rateLimit) builds it for v1.
• The route-wrapper graph. withRouteHandler imports request-scope.server.ts and nothing heavier. Import a resolver at the call site, never from the wrapper or lib/core/application — see Step 6.

Step 5: Add it to the golden corpus

Add the key to both the input and expected objects of the 'a fully populated config' fixture in lib/permission-groups/fields.test.ts, set to a non-default value. That fixture is the pinned coercion corpus: a row that changes in a later diff is a semantic decision someone defends rather than a silent regression. The file's other assertions derive from DEFAULT_PERMISSION_GROUP_CONFIG (wire order, idempotence, read-schema acceptance, the 2000-iteration seeded fuzz, write/default/read key-set agreement, boolean-to-PLATFORM_FEATURES coverage) and pick your key up for free, as does features.test.ts.

Give the funnel test a real workspaceOrganizationId. requireCapability short-circuits on context.workspaceOrganizationId === null (lib/core/application/workspace-authorization.ts:204), so a fixture whose workspace context leaves it null passes with the gate present and with it removed — a vacuous test that reads as load-bearing.

Add a case to capabilities.test.ts for any rule with logic beyond reading one key. For an allowlist assert all three states — null permits every member, a populated list only the named ones, [] permits none — as capabilities.test.ts already does for knowledge.connectors.

Step 6: Keep the graph light

scripts/check-application-graph.ts walks runtime import / export … from edges (import type is erased and allowed) out of five guarded roots:

Guarded root	Forbidden
lib/core/application/index.ts, and lib/permission-groups/ capabilities.ts / capability-assertions.ts / config-scope.server.ts	providers/, blocks/, tools/, executor/, lib/uploads/, lib/workflows/
lib/core/utils/with-route-handler.ts	those six plus lib/billing/, lib/permission-groups/resolve.server, lib/auth, lib/copilot/, lib/knowledge/

lib/billing/ stays allowed for the funnel roots because resolve.server.ts legitimately reads the subscription to decide whether an organization is on an enterprise plan; the wrapper is a lifecycle shim that opens the memo scope and nothing more. That split is why the scope is two files.

Breaking this never announces itself — past regressions surfaced only as unrelated tests failing on partial mocks of modules they never meant to load. After adding an import, run this audit first.

Step 7: Verify

bun run check:permission-group-enforcement
bun run check:application-graph
bun run check:capability-subject
cd apps/sim && bun run type-check
bun run --cwd apps/sim test lib/permission-groups

Also bun run check:api-validation if you touched a contract or the group routes. bun run check:audits runs all of these; it derives its list from the check:* scripts in package.json, so a new audit is opted out deliberately rather than opted in.

Read the success lines, not the exit codes — compare the counts against the previous run and check they grew by exactly what you added: an operation-declared capability adds one operation and one capability; a raw-route or parameterized capability adds one capability and no operation; an executor-gated or UI-only item adds neither:

✓ permission-group enforcement: <N> operations declare a capability, <M> capabilities all enforced
✅ Application graph clean: <N> roots reach none of <M> forbidden module trees
check:capability-subject — <N> v1 files, <M> capability subjects resolved through capabilityGovernedUserId.

The enforcement audit is all-or-nothing — one success line or findings, no migration mode that exits 0 with work outstanding. Because it reads source text it also refuses success when its own parsers come up empty or disagree with each other; if a self-check fires, teach the parsers the new form rather than working around it.

The audits prove reachability: your capability is named somewhere, your key is read by some rule. They cannot tell whether the rule's logic is right or whether every operation reaching the behavior declares it. Green is not proof the gate fires.

Traps

An operation carries exactly ONE capability, and a narrower capability must subsume the broader one it replaced. knowledge.create and knowledge.upload list configKeys: ['disableKnowledgeBaseCreation', 'hideKnowledgeBaseTab'] and OR both in deniedBy, because moving KB creation off knowledge.use would otherwise let a group that withheld the whole module still create one through the API. Any time you re-point an operation to a more specific capability, the specific rule must read both keys.

.catch() on an array field is a fail-open security bug. z.array(item).catch(fallback) is whole-value tolerant: one bad member discards every good one. On an allowlist the fallback is null, and null means unrestricted — a partly corrupt allowlist stops restricting anything. tolerantArray in fields.ts filters element by element, keeping what parses and failing closed. Never swap it for .catch(), never hand-roll a parallel coercion path.

parsePermissionGroupConfig must keep its Array.isArray guard. typeof [] === 'object', so a truthy-object check alone lets an array through and z.object().parse([]) throws — reachable, because the column is jsonb and a row can genuinely hold []. The guard returns the defaults there instead of taking down the request. tolerantArray carries the mirror-image guard.

An empty allowlist denies everything; null allows everything. They must never collapse — not in the parser, the UI setter, or a deniedBy. allowlistDenies encodes it as allowed !== null && !allowed.includes(member); a ?? [] anywhere on this path inverts the unrestricted case.

Canonicalize both halves of an integration allowlist before intersecting, never after. allowedIntegrations and the deployment's ALLOWED_INTEGRATIONS are written independently, so one can name slack and the other slack_v2; fold only case and they intersect to nothing, hiding an integration both policies allow. Compose intersectAccessControlAllowlists / toAccessControlAllowlist / resolveAccessControlBlockType from integration-allowlist.ts — never a hand-rolled Set intersection — and successor-resolve the type you test against the result the same way. They resolve through block-successors.generated.ts, a projection of the block registry because check:application-graph forbids the funnel from importing blocks/; check:block-successors fails the build when it drifts. Read that map only through Object.hasOwn: the ids arriving are admin-supplied jsonb, and a group naming constructor otherwise gets back an inherited function and 500s every enforcement path that reads it.

Not everyone goes through the funnel.

Principal	Rule
Workspace API key	Authorizes as the workspace — no user, so no group resolves and operation.capability does not apply. Never substitute the key's creator (not in the funnel, checkAccess, v1, or the log projection): it applies a bystander's group to every caller of a shared key and breaks the key when that person leaves. The escape is closed at the door — minting a workspace key is itself capability-gated
Delegated executor with a sim_user subject	Role only (requireCurrentHumanRole). A run carries the trigger-er's role but not their capabilities: a capability names what a person may reach, while a run reaches resources because a block does. Applying capabilities would make "hide Tables" a kill-switch breaking every workflow with a Table block
Actorless deployment run (delegated executor, mode: 'deployment', no subject)	Passes through — a deployed workflow acts with the workspace's authority, not its author's group. Denying would 403 every scheduled run, webhook and public-API call the moment a group withheld anything
Copilot	NOT exempt. A delegated principal with a sim_user subject whose serviceId is anything other than executor takes the full requireCurrentHumanAccess, capability check included. Copilot acts as the person

What a run does is still governed by assertPermissionsAllowed. An item that must bind a deployed run belongs at enforcement: 'executor'.

Capability is checked after the role check, on purpose. requireCurrentHumanAccess runs requirePermission first. NoWorkspaceAccessError is concealed as a 404 by the v2 surface so a non-member cannot learn the resource exists; refusing on capability first hands an outsider an oracle for which capabilities the organization withholds. Do not reorder, and do not add a capability check upstream of the role check in a raw route — the v1 middleware states the same rule in its TSDoc.

Checklist Before Finishing

• Kind and enforcement chosen deliberately; ui-only justified in writing if used
• It is a gate, not a projection — a projection belongs in lib/logs/log-projection.ts with capability: 'none' on the routes, and still refuses queries that select on the withheld field
• Entry appended to PERMISSION_GROUP_FIELDS, permissive default, restriction-phrased name
• Category present in PLATFORM_CATEGORY_ORDER, named after what is withheld
• hint says what access is revoked, never "hide" — it is also the active-restriction prose
• Non-boolean key has a featureExtras picker that refuses empty and collapses "all" to null
• Capability id in CAPABILITY_IDS, rule in CAPABILITY_RULES under satisfies, configKeys lists every key deniedBy reads
• A narrower capability replacing a broader one also reads the broader key
• Declared on every operation it governs, or asserted from the use case with a // permission-group-enforced: annotation raising through refuseCapability / capabilityRefusal
• New operations minted through a define*Operation builder and exported from an *Operations registry
• Any capability: 'none' carries a // permission-group-exempt: reason
• Every gate's subject comes from the capabilityGoverned* helper for the identity it holds, and a persisted subject is a required string | null
• v1 routes thread the capability through middleware.ts; table routes pass a TableAccessPrincipal
• An integration-shaped allowlist canonicalizes through on both sides of every comparison